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Abstract
After Porsche SE took over Volkswagen AG, its supervisory board
consists of three groups: The Porsche shareholders hold 6 seats, while
the 324,000 Volkswagen employees and the 12,000 Porsche employees
will be represented by 3 delegates each. This paper perceives each
of these three groups as unitary players and presents a power-index
analysis of this supervisory board. It shows that, unless the Porsche
employees are made completely powerless, Porsche and VW employees
will have identical power regardless of the actual distribution of seats
on the employees’ side. This analysis demonstrates that the request of
the Volkswagen employees (for more seats than the Porsche employees
in the future supervisory board) is unfounded.
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1 Introduction
The owners of the German car manufacturer “Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG”
have created the “Porsche Automobil Holding SE” (henceforth: Porsche SE)
in 2007. Porsche SE owns 100 percent of Porsche AG and has, in late 2008,
taken over the majority of the much bigger Volkswagen AG (VW). The su-
pervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) of Porsche SE consists of six representatives
of the shareholders and the employees, respectively. After the takeover, both
the current 324,000 VW employees and the 12,000 Porsche employees will be
represented by three supervisory board members each. A societas europeae
(SE) has to negotiate the conditions of workers’ co-determination with the
workers involved.1 At the time the SE was founded, Porsche did not domi-
nate VW yet. Hence, the VW workers did not take part in these negotiations.
Bernd Osterloh, head of the VW workers’ council, has called the plan unac-
ceptable and “a slap in the face” for VW employees.2 The head of Porsche’s
workers’ council, Uwe Hu¨ck, has rejected Osterloh’s request. He considered
it an expression of equality that each of the two employee groups will be
represented by the same number of delegates in the supervisory board.3
The VW workers’ council has brought legal action against this plan, de-
manding an increased number of VW representatives. In April 2008, a Ger-
man labor court rejected this claim because, at the time of the court decision,
Porsche SE has held only 31 percent of VW’s shares and, therefore, did not
dominate VW.4 Before the takeover was completed, the VW workers’ coun-
cil has brought an appeal against this decision to the state labor court in
Stuttgart in which it planned to establish that Porsche SE already effec-
tively controls VW.5 Leech (2001) argued that 30 percent shares would be
enough to have almost full power if the other 70 percent are fully dispersed
1See Amann (2008).
2AsiaOne (2007. The workers’ council of Porsche SE is, after the takeover, clearly
dominated by VW employees; see Amann (2008), with Osterloh as the elected chairman.
3Manager Magazin (2007).
4Arbeitsgericht Stuttgart, AZ 12 BV 109/07. The court based his decision mainly on
this fact and did not decide whether the existing agreement on co-determination had to
be modified after a takeover.
5See GlobalInsight (2008).
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(among 70 shareholders with just 1 percent each).6
After the first success in court, Porsche apparently made two offers to the
VW workers.7 First of all, the representatives of VW employees may receive
a veto right in the supervisory board of the Porsche SE. Moreover, decisions
regarding the erection and reallocation of production sites may require a 2/3
majority.
Even though the concrete VW vs. Porsche case seems to have been settled,
it raises an abstract question which deserves an answer based on economic
theory: Is a larger group (of employees) entitled to a larger number of seats
in the supervisory boards? Under which circumstances is the number of seats
relevant for the influence of this group? This question is not only relevant
for the composition of supervisory boards, but also for the composition of
decision bodies in federal systems, such as the EU council. Should the larger
member states have a greater number of votes, proportional to their popu-
lation? The principle ”one man, one vote”, a very basic idea of democracy,
seems to imply a proportional representation at least at first glance.
If, however, it is the aim of the institutional design to endow each mem-
ber of the constituency with equal influence (or power), then this principle
appears useless. ”Equal power” requires a quantitative operationalization of
power. This is provided by the economic theory of power index analysis. This
theory would decline a blind request for ”equal votes per capita”. Penrose
(1946) has argued that equal votes per capita would endow larger groups of
voters with an overproportional, more precisely: quadratic, amount of power.
If a body consists of many groups, two of which control the same number of
votes, then their power index is identical. If one of these groups is endowed
with twice the number of votes, its power then is not just two times the
power of the reference group, but four times.
The contributions of Banzhaf (1965, 1968) have demonstrated that play-
ers’ power in a voting body is not necessarily proportional to their votes. A
very simple example may highlight this point: If two shareholder both own 50
6VW is, however, not a case of dispersed ownership, as the federal state Lower-Saxony
controls 20 percent.
7See WAZ (2008), citing the German news magazine Focus. However, according to the
same source, the VW workers council claimed to have not received such an offer.
3
percent of their firm and decide with absolute majority, then both have equal
power. With 51 vs. 49 percent however, player 1 has total power (power in-
dex 1), while 2 is powerless (power index 0). Even though the ratio of the two
players’ shares (or votes) is almost identical in the two scenarios, the ratio of
the two players’ power indices differ dramatically. In Banzhaf’s canonical ex-
ample, which won him a lawsuit, his power index analysis demonstrated the
unfairness of proportional votes in the supervisory board of Nassau County
(NY).8 Banzhaf argued that there exists no situation in which the votes of one
of three smallest members would have any impact on the outcome. In other
words, the whole power is equally distributed among the three largest mem-
bers, rendering the three smaller ones powerless.9 As a result of Banzhaf’s
legal action, the composition of the Nassau supervisory board was changed
several times. 10
Drawing on the economic theory of power, this paper argues that the
claim of the VW workers’ council was unfounded. What really counts is not
the number of seats or voting rights in a supervisory board, but the influence
or power a group or player can exert. Economic theory operationalizes “in-
fluence” by using power indexes. The analysis in this paper shows that the
influence of VW representatives in the supervisory board of the Porsche SE
cannot be adapted to the different number of employees they represent. The
analysis perceives the situation in the future supervisory board of Porsche
SE as a 3-player game: First the Porsche shareholders (with 50 percent of
the votes), then the Porsche and the VW workers’ representatives (with the
other 50 percent distributed among them). It demonstrates that Porsche
and VW workers’ power is identical, regardless of the actual distribution of
8In 1965, this board consisted of representatives from six districts. The two largest
districts held 31 seats each, the next two held 28 and 21 seats respectively, and the smallest
districts were endowed with two seats each. For a collective decision, an absolute majority
was required, hence 58 votes.
9See Hodge/Klima (2005, 124f.). This result can be derived without computing a formal
power index: Whenever two of the three larger members agree, this coalition controls an
absolute majority of yes- or no-votes. Hence, no absolute majority coalition is formed only
due to the cooperation of one of the smaller districts.
10In 1994, the votes were 30, 38, 22, 15, 7, 6. The largest district enjoys a normalized
Banzhaf power of 0.25, while the smallest district holds 0.0192, see Hodge/Klima (2005,
141).
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voting rights. Only in extreme cases, when Porsche representatives are made
powerless, the VW workers’ representatives can be endowed with more power
than their counterparts. Hence, it is not possible to adapt the situation so as
to endow both groups on the workers’ side with “equal power per represented
capita”.
Several power index concepts exist. Penrose (1946) has measured voting
power by the probability with which a member of a voting body “carries” the
collective decision, i.e., his own preference is identical to the social preference.
A member is more powerful, the more this probability exceeds 0.5. The
power indices of Banzhaf (1965) and Penrose (1946) come to identical results.
Banzhaf’s index is based on the probability with which a member is “critical”
in winning coalitions. A group of members is a winning coalition if the sum of
the votes exceeds the quorum required for a collective decision.11 A member
of a winning coalition is critical if his withdrawal from the coalition would
turn it into a losing coalition (i.e., the remaining number of votes is smaller
than the quorum). The number of times a member is critical measures his
power. Summing up all individual powers over all members yields the total
power. The (normalized) Banzhaf power-index of a player is his individual
power, divided by the total power.
Modifications of the Banzhaf power index have been proposed by John-
ston (1978), Deegan/Packel (1978), and Holler/Packel (1983). The Johnson
index gives credit to being “critical” that is inversely related to the size of the
winning coalition. Deegan and Packel only count minimum winning coali-
tions, which in particular makes sense if the value of prevailing is a private
good that has to be distributed among the members of a winning coalition.
Holler and Packel perceive the value of prevailing as a public good, but also
limit their view to minimum winning coalitions. A different concept to mea-
sure voting power has been proposed by Shapley/Shubik (1954). Their index
looks at all possible permutations of the committee members and evaluates
which member is “pivotal” (i.e., turns the coalition into a prevailing one).
An individual power index is the number of constellations in which a member
is pivotal, divided by the total number with which all members are pivotal.
11“Coalition” is used in an informal or spontaneous sense, it requires no contract between
its members.
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This concept is especially useful if the sequence in which coalitions are formed
is relevant. However, for the analysis of a supervisory board in which the
chairperson has a tie-breaking vote, this index is of little use.
All these index concepts refer to simple voting games. However, inter-
actions between members of a committee can be more complex (e.g., if one
member is allowed to set the agenda). The “strategic power index” of Ste-
unenberg/Schmidtchen/Koboldt (1999) can be applied to such sequential
games. As the subsequent analysis relates to simple voting games only, and
the prize can be considered a public good, the Banzhaf index appears to be
adequate. The usage of the Shapley-Shubik-Index or the Packel-Holler-Index,
however, would not lead to qualitatively different results.
The next section presents an abstract analysis of the 3-player voting game.
The results are used in Section 3, which evaluates the numerical examples
relevant for the VW case. Section 4 evaluates three modifications of the
basic analysis. These modifications are relevant for the VW-Porsche case
under scrutiny. Section 4.1 analyzes the power situation if a 2/3 majority
is required. In 4.2., the impact of a veto right assigned to the VW workers’
representatives in the supervisory board of Porsche SE is analyzed. In 4.3,
the realistic idea of a tie-breaking vote for the shareholders’ side is taken
into consideration as well. 4.4 discards the previously made assumption that
the employers’ side consists of a homogeneous bloc by introducing a maver-
ick, i.e., an employer who votes independently from his peers. Section 4.5
combines the analysis of tie-breaking vote and maverick. Section 5 presents
conclusions.
2 Banzhaf power in a 3-player voting game
Consider a voting body that consists of three players i = 1..3 who have to
make a binary decision (i.e., yes or no). The players are endowed with voting
rights Ri ∈ IN. For convenience we replace the notion of voting rights by
voting weights Wi ∈ [0, 1]. An individual Wi is computed as
Wi =
Ri∑3
i=1 Ri
.
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Thus,
∑3
i=1 Wi = 1. For a proposal (“yes”) to become the collective
decision, the number of voting weights cast in favor of it need to exceed a
threshold value, the quorum Q, which is fixed ex-ante with 1/2 ≤ Q < 1.
E.g., the absolute majority rule is expressed by Q = 1/2. Consider a subset
I ⊆ {1; 2; 3} the members of which vote for a proposal, with
∑
i∈I
Ri > Q.
Then, this proposal becomes the collective decision of the voting body,
and such a coalition I is called a “winning coalition”. We assume, without
loss of generality, that the three members of the body can be ordered with
regard to their voting weights, i.e., 1 ≥ W1 ≥ W2 ≥ W3 ≥ 0.
The “grand coalition” of all players is always a winning coalition. The
possible coalitions, winning or not, can be ordered with regard to their size in
terms of voting rights held by their members. One ranking, which is directly
implied by the assumption made above, is 1 ≥ W1 + W2 ≥ W1 + W3. The
assumption says nothing about the relative size of W1 and W2 + W3: either
W1 ≥ W2 + W3 or W2 + W3 ≥ W1. Despite this, the assumption is sufficient
to derive all the possible power profiles (B1, B2, B3), where Bi denotes the
Banzhaf power index of player i (the concept was verbally explained in the
Introduction).
Proposition: Consider a voting game with three players i = 1..3 holding
voting weights Wi with 1 ≥ W1 ≥ W2 ≥ W3 ≥ 0 and
∑3
i=1 = 1. A quorum Q
with 1/2 ≤ Q < 1 exists. This game results in only one out of the following
four Banzhaf power-index profiles (B1, B2, B3): either (1, 0, 0), (0.6, 0.2, 0.2),
(0.5, 0.5, 0), or (0.33, 0.33, 0.33).
Proof:
The prevailing power profile depends on the relative size of the quorum
Q and the voting weights of the three players:
1. If Q ≥ W1 +W2, then the only winning coalition is the grand coalition
{1; 2; 3}. Each player is “critical” here, hence the resulting power index
profile is (0.33, 0.33, 0.33).12
12To better distinguish power indexes Bi from voting weights Wi, I write the former as
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2. If W1 + W2 > Q ≥ W1 + W3, then we have two winning coalitions:
{A;B;C} and {A;B}. Player C is never critical, while A and B each
are critical in both winning coalitions. Hence, the power index profile
is (0.5, 0.5, 0).
3. If W1 + W3 > Q ≥ max{R1;W2 + W3} then three winning coalitions
exist: {A;B;C}, {A;B}, and {A;C}. While player A is critical in all
of them, player B is critical only in {A;B}, and player C is critical
only in {A;C}. The total Banzhaf power is 5, and the resulting power
index profile is (0.6, 0.2, 0.2).
4. If W1 > Q ≥ W2 + W3, then we have a fourth winning coalition,
namely {A}. Hence, only player A is critical in all of the four winning
coalitions, and the resulting power profile is (1, 0, 0).
5. If W1 ≤ Q < W2 + W3, then the fourth winning coalition is {B;C}.
Now each of the three players is two times critical, respectively. This
results in a power profile (0.33, 0.33, 0.33).
This case distinction proves the proposition.
3 Application to the VW vs. Porsche case
The previous (and rather abstract) analysis starts with the assumption that
the three members of a voting body can be sorted according to their vot-
ing weights. In the VW-Porsche-case, the biggest player is formed by the
shareholders’ representatives. Denote this group as S; the voting weight is
WS = 1/2. Even though this figure has not been contested by the VW work-
ers’ council, the subsequent analysis also allows for different values of WS.
The other two groups are the representatives of the VW employees (denoted
as V) and of Porsche employees (P). Since the VW workers demand more
voting rights than P, but not more than S, we can limit our view to voting
weight configurations with 1 ≥ WS ≥ WV ≥ WP ≥ 0.
The result derived in the previous section implies that the power ratio
is never equal to the ratio of the workers represented by players V and P.
decimal figures (defining 0.33 = 1/3) and the latter as fractions.
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If both P and V enjoy power, then the power ratio BP/BV equals one. A
deviation from one is only possible if P is deprived of his power.
The voting weights of all players add up to one: WS + WV + WP = 1.
Hence, the analysis can be limited to discussing only the voting weights of
players S and V, as the voting weight of P is implicitly given by WP =
1 − (WS + WV ). Substituting the right hand side of this equation into the
assumption WV ≥ WP yields WV ≥ 1−WS −WV , which is equivalent to
WS ≥ 1− 2WV . (1)
The bold triangle in Figure 1 shows all the possible combinations of WS
and WV . First of all, these combinations have to be on or above the main
diagonale (through the origin), as WS ≥ WV . Second, they have to be on
and below the flat diagonal line that connects WS = 1 and WV = 1, as no
player can have more than all votes. Third, they have to be on and above
the steeper diagonal line, represented by the equation WS = 1 − 2WV , due
to inequality (1). Finally, all voting weights are non-negative: WS ≥ 0 and
WV ≥ 0. These five constraints are symbolized in Figure 1 by tiny arrows.
The horizontal dashed line in Figure 1 represents the quorum Q = 1/2.
Above this line and within the bold triangle, we have WS > Q and, thus,
the Banzhaf power index profile (1, 0, 0). This relates to case 4 of the above
proposition.
On the horizontal line, but only for WV < 1/2, the resulting power profile
is (0.6,0.2,0.2), see case 3 of the proposition. This case also includes the
initial situation with WP = 1/2 and WV = 1/4, implying WS = 1/4, that is
contested in court by the VW workers.
Now consider the voting weight combination VS = VW = 1/2, represented
by the bold dot in the right corner of the large triangle. It implies WP = 0,
hence the parties are in case 2 of the proposition. Thus, the power profile is
(0.5, 0.5, 0). Below the horizontal dashed line, in the bold triangle, the power
profile is (0.33, 0.33, 0.33), as derived in case 5 of the proposition.
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Figure 1: Power profiles if quorum Q = 1/2
WS
1
(1, 0, 0) 
(0.6, 0.2, 0.2)
incl. WS=1/2, WV=1/4
1/2
(0.5, 0.5, 0) 
(0.33, 0.33, 0.33)
WV11/21/4
4 Proposed modifications
Two modifications of the current co-determination agreement for Porsche SE
have been discussed, as explained in the Introduction: Important decisions
may require a majority of (more than) 2/3, and the VW workers’ representa-
tives may receive a veto right. These modifications are discussed in sections
4.1 and 4.2. Section 4.3 adds the idea of a tie-breaking vote for the chairman
of the supervisory board, who is elected by the shareholders’ side.
A fourth modification of the basic analysis is presented in section 4.4:
Until then, it is assumed that the shareholders form a homogeneous player,
i.e., always vote identically. This assumption is relaxed in section 4.3, where
the “maverick” shareholder is introduced, as this is a relevant part of the
VW-Porsche-case which has an impact on the results derived so far. Section
4.5 looks at a scenario where one of the shareholders is a maverick, and the
shareholders’ side holds a tie-breaking vote.
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4.1 2/3 majority
Figure 2 demonstrates the analysis of Q = 2/3. The bold triangle contains
all possible combinations of voting weights WS and WV , just as in Figure 1.
The current situation is symbolized by the point WS = 1/2 and WV = 1/4,
which implies WP = 1/4.
Figure 2: Power profiles if quorum Q = 2/3
WS
1
(1, 0, 0)
(0.6, 0.2, 0.2)
incl. WS=1/2, WV=1/4
1/2
(0.5, 0.5, 0)
2/3
1/3
(0.33, 0.33, 0.33) 
WV11/21/4 1/3
In the area above WS = 2/3, the prevailing power profile is (1, 0, 0). For
1/3 < WS ≤ 2/3, different cases may occur: If WV ≤ 1/3, then player S
can create a winning coalition with just one of the two other players (who
are unable to form a winning coalition). According to the proposition, the
power profile is (0.6, 0.2, 0.2); this case also contains the current situation.
If, on the other hand, WV > 1/3, then player P is powerless even if he holds
a positive voting weight as he is unable to form a winning coalition with S
or V alone. The resulting power profile is (0.5, 0.5, 0).
For the VW-Porsche-case, only the horizontal line at the level WS = 1/2 is
relevant. With identical voting weights, players V and P would enjoy an iden-
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tical power of 0.2. With WV > 1/3, implying WP < 1/6, V’s power amounts
to 0.5 whereas P’s power shrinks to zero. With regard to the Banzhaf power
index, there is no difference between the cases Q = 1/2 and Q = 2/3 if player
S maintains 50 percent of the votes.
Result: The introduction of a 2/3 quorum (instead of an absolute ma-
jority rule) does not alter the power situation of the VW workers.
4.2 Veto right for player V
A veto right for player V means that he can block a majority decision for
“yes”. If V exercises this right, the collective decision would be “no” even if
both S and P vote for “yes” and WS + WP > Q. Hence, there is no winning
coalition that excludes V and, moreover, V is always critical.
With the absolute majority rule (Q = 1/2), only two winning coalitions
exist: {S;V ;P} and {S;V }. Both S and V are critical in both coalitions,
while P is never critical. Thus, the resulting Banzhaf power-index profile is
(0.5, 0.5, 0).
Result: Introducing a veto right for V would have the same effect as
reassigning all voting rights from P to V.
4.3 Tie-breaking vote
Corporate law often assigns a tie-breaking vote to the chairperson of the
supervisory board, who usually is determined by the shareholder side. With
WS = 1/2 and Q = 1/2, the tie-breaking vote can only kick in if player
S takes one position while P and V take the other. In that case, {S} is a
winning coalition due to its tie-breaking vote, which implies that neither V
nor P are critical. The resulting power profile thus is (1, 0, 0).
If both a veto right for V and a tie-breaking vote for S exists, situations
may occur in which these two rules conflict with each other. Then, a consti-
tutional provision is required that regulates which rule overrides the other.
If the tie-breaking vote overrides the veto, we are in the same power situa-
tion as described above: {S} is a winning coalition, and the power profile is
(1, 0, 0).
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If, however, V’s veto right overrides the tie-breaking vote of S, then {S}
is not a winning coalition. The players are in the same situation as the one
described in section 4.2, and the resulting power profile is (0.5, 0.5, 0).
Result: If the shareholders’ side holds a tie-breaking vote, it enjoys all
the power, unless it can be overridden by a veto of V.
4.4 A maverick on the shareholders’ side
This section is devoted to analyzing situations in which a member of the
shareholders’ representatives shows a tendency to occasionally disagree with
his peers. Formally, the set of shareholders S is divided into two subsets:
the maverick {M} on the one hand, and the other shareholders, who vote
homogeneously, on the other hand. Denote the latter bloc as A, with S =
A ∪ {M} and M /∈ A.
A famous example for such a maverick is the chairman of the supervisory
board of Volkswagen AG, Ferdinand Pie¨ch, who lately cast in absentia a
sealed vote which led to a victory of the employees side.13 If a maverick
chooses to always vote in accordance with one group on the employees’ side,
say, V, this situation could be analyzed as a 3-player game using the results
derived in section 2. If, however, the maverick prefers to vote completely
independent of the three other players, then the game consists of four instead
of three players. The power profiles in a four player game cannot be derived
from the general analysis in section 3.
In what follows we concentrate on the scenario of the VW-Porsche case
and, therefore, assume that the voting weights of the shareholders’ represen-
tatives always add up to 0.5, with one member as a maverick. The aim is
to evaluate whether (and to which extent) employee representative V would
now benefit if voting rights are shifted from P to him (for different values of
the quorum Q).
Table 1 shows the Banzhaf power index values of players V and P for
different parameter settings. It is obvious that, in most cases, either BV = BP
or PP = 0 holds, just as in the case without maverick. The only exceptions
13See Spiegel online (2008). Pie¨ch is also a member of the supervisory board of Porsche
AG and Porsche SE.
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Table 1: Power of V and P if one shareholder is a maverick.
Votes Q = 1/2 Q = 2/3 Q = 3/4
V P BV BP BV BP BV BP
3 3 0.25 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.333 0.333
4 2 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 0.375 0.125
5 1 0.333 0.167 0.5 0 0.5 0
6 0 0.6 0 0.5 0 0.5 0
are
• Q = 1/2 and W holds 5 votes;
• Q = 3/4 and W holds 4 votes.
In both scenarios, A controls 5 votes, while M has just one vote. In
the first of these scenarios, a coalition prevails if it controls at least seven
votes; moreover, V has 5 votes, P one. In this scenario, we have six winning
coalitions: {V ;M ;P} and {A;M ;P} with 7 votes; {A;V } with 10 votes;
{A;M;V} and {A;V;P} with 11 votes; and finally {A;M ;V ;P} (12 votes).
Players A and V are 4 times critical each, players M and P are critical in two
coalitions, respectively. This implies BP = 1/6 and BV = 1/3.
In the second scenario, a coalition prevails if it controls at least ten votes.
Thus, three winning coalitions exist: {A;M ;V } (10 votes), {A;V ;P} (11
votes), and {A;M ;V ;P} (12 votes). Players A and V are critical in all of
these coalitions, while players M and P are critical just once, respectively.
Thus, BP = 1/8 and BV = 3/8.
Result: If one shareholder is a maverick, it is possible to endow V with
more power than P without making the latter powerless (either absolute
majority and 5 votes for V, or 3/4-majority and 4 votes for V). In both
scenarios, V would enjoy three times the power of player P.
4.5 Maverick and tie-breaking vote
This section analyzes the power situation in a supervisory board if a maverick
on the shareholders’ side exists, and the chairperson has a tie-breaking vote.
We have to distinguish two possibilities here: the chairperson can either
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be the maverick, or one of the other shareholders. We look at the 12-person
board in which the shareholders and the employees have 6 seats each, and ask
again under which circumstances a shift of voting rights from one employee
group (P) to the other (V) increases the power of the latter, starting with
WV = WP = 1/4.
Table 2: Power of V and P with maverick and tie breaking vote, Q = 1/2.
Votes Chairperson among A M is chairperson
WV WP BV BP BV BP
1/4 1/4 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167
1/3 1/6 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167
5/12 1/12 0.167 0.167 0.333 0
1/2 0 0.333 0 0.333 0
Table 2 shows the power of the employee representatives in the different
constellations. If the chairperson is member of group A, this player is criti-
cal in all winning coalitions (except for AMVP and MVP). The other three
players are critical two times, respectively. This gives a Banzhaf power of
BA = 0.5 to player A. Remarkably, the Banzhaf power of V and P is inde-
pendent of the actual configuration of voting rights on the employees’ side.
If the maverick shareholder is also chairman, he can exert his tie-breaking
vote only in two cases: He agrees with A while the employees are in oppo-
sition. The only other constellation is that V has 5 votes and agrees with
the maverick, opposed by A and P. This explains why V’s power increases to
0.33 already if he has 5 votes.
Result: If the shareholders’ side is characterized by a maverick and a
tie-breaking vote, then the employees’ representatives V and P either have
identical power, or P is powerless.
5 Conclusions
Shifting votes from P to V does not increase V’s power, except for two cases:
V’s power can be increased by making P powerless, which is not intended by
the parties in the law suit under scrutiny. No shift of voting rights from P to
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V can leads to a Banzhaf-power ratio BV /BP that is greater than one and
finite. Using a 2/3 majority does not change this result (with and without a
maverick). Introducing a veto right for V would make P powerless.
The only constellation in which a finite Banzhaf-power ratio greater than
one can be achieved is if a maverick on the shareholders’ side exists and the
shareholders do not have a tie-breaking vote, see section 4.4. To implement
such a situation, however, is not within the discretion of the court.
If equal power per employee is the ultimate goal, and the power analysis is
based on the Banzhaf-index, then the law suit pursued by the VW workers’
council is, thus, unfounded. The VW workers may have other motives, but
a desire for a “more adequate” power-ratio can not be brought forward to
sustain their claim.
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